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サディク　フセイン
SADIKU HUSEIN
概　略
　今日のシリアは 40万人以上の犠牲者および数百万人の難民と国内避難民を生んだ内戦
によって滅ぼされた国である。本論文はシリアにおいて内戦に発展した蜂起を起こりや
すくした複数の主要な要因の特定に焦点を当てている。この要因は国内（政治的、社会的、
経済的、環境的）から外国（シリアを取り巻く地域的および国際の要因）のものまである。
検出された要因のタイムラインは内部要因から始まり、2011年の蜂起に終わる。続いて、
本論文においては、汚職を非難し、改革を求める平和的抗議から始まり、2012年に反政
府運動と残酷な内戦へと発展した蜂起の激化を考察している。平和的抗議が暴力に変わっ
た過程と理由を理解するために、2011年と 2012年の間に起きた三つの主要な「軸」が分
析されている。本論文においては、上記の期間中に起き、脆弱な国家を作り出すことに
直接的または間接的なインパクトを持った出来事や事件の歴史的分析を手法としている。
その他に、紛争の激化を分析するに当たり三つの主要な軸を分析するためにエリート操
作理論を活用している。本論文によるシリア紛争の考察は 2012年までに限定している。
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Introduction 
Syria was ruled by an autocrat-family based regime in the name of the secular pan-Arab national-socialist Ba’ath party, 
which declared a state of emergency in the country for more than 40 years. The 2011 uprising in Syria was not the first revolt 
and protest against the Ba’ath regime. The use of violence by the regime towards people to suppress their demands was not 
a new strategy as well, as the first uprising against the regime, in 1982, was bloodily suppressed. It is certain that the regime 
change and transition from an autocratic one to a democratically ruled government possessed an increased risk of an eruption 
of a civil conflict (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010). While some researchers considered economic grievances as one of the 
main reasons behind the “revolt against crony capitalism” (Butter 2015: 10), or the “uprising of more marginalized social 
groups” (Azmeh  2014: 4), this paper emphasizes the necessity to understand and analyze main challenges Syria was facing 
externally and internally before the uprising. 
The Arab Spring and the sentimental calling for change and democracy in the Middle East did not spare the military-
ruled bastion, Syria. Protests started on March 15, 2011 in the ancient Jordan-bordered city of Dar’a, when high school 
children wrote some ‘Arab Spring’ inspired slogans on school walls. The slogans were the same ones used in the revolutions 
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. It stated, ‘the people want to topple the regime,’ and resulted in local secret police arresting 
and detaining 15 high school boys. The main person responsible for the secret police in Dar’a was Bashar al-Assad’s close 
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cousin, General Atef Najeeb.  The secret police brutally beat and tortured the high school boys, while the families’ peaceful 
attempt to free their children from detainment was met by bullets from the secret service. This single incident of cruelty by 
the secret police inflamed the protests, which quickly spread in almost every city in the country. The Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad responded to the protests by rejecting the decision to step down and adopting a full use of force against protesters. 
According to the Human Rights Watch World Report-Syria in 2018 around, 400,000 people were killed because of 
the Syrian conflict since 2011; 12.8 million were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria; around 5 million 
seeking refuge abroad; over 6 million people displaced internally (World Report-Syria 2018).
Key factors that made Syria prone to Uprising in 2011
I. Internal Factors
  I. I. Empty promises by the Syrian regime
After Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father’s presidency, Syria may have looked like a stable country at a first sight, 
but the country was facing many problems. Among them were underdevelopment, corruption, unemployment, and high 
population growth.  The young president promised political and economical reforms and changes in the country, raising 
optimistic hopes on both domestic and international levels (Raphaeli 2007, Borshchevskaya 2010). Bashar al-Assad initially 
inspired many by his ideology for democratic reforms. However, after the Damascus spring of political and social debates 
started in 2000 and 2001, he arrested all the political activists who wanted fair and free democratic elections. Thus, most 
critics felt that Basahr al-Assad had failed to deliver his pledged reforms. There was a dilemma about the kind of leadership 
that could be offered to a faltering authoritarian country in the current world. He was faced with challenges on how to 
strengthen and liberalize the country’s economy without losing power. In his first months in office as a president, he sought 
to build a Syrian version of the “China Model.” He wanted to legitimately build a country by carefully calibrating political 
reforms. After assuming power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad assured the people of Syria that his regime would introduce 
economic reforms such as opening modern markets that allow foreign investments (Kerr and Larkin 2015). 
He also promised to liberalize the economy and allow foreign banks to operate in Syria. This happened after a big 
number of Syrians expressed their desire of having economic reforms first before political ones, as economic reforms could 
lift them out of poverty. However, countervailing local interests of a few oligarchs hindered various attempts to reform. 
Additionally, the centralized socialist type of economy made the dream impossible. The Assad government remained 
repressive and became more stultified. The regime of Bashar took hesitant reform measures in the financial markets, because 
it realized that strong private markets need a strong banking sector, which could guarantee proper processes of selling 
foreign currency. The government enacted a new banking law in 2001 that provided better environments for private banking 
(Vloeberghs 2015).
Focusing on the service sector, the policies that were in place helped few citizens, particularly those who had links with 
the Assad regime and few members of the Sunni merchants based in Aleppo and Damascus (Kerr and Larkin 2015).  Despite 
his promises for political reforms, and despite achieving some positive steps towards liberalization just after six months 
of his presidency, Bashar proceeded with the same style of leadership whereby he banned all public gatherings and made 
it illegal for more than five people to converge in one place. Bashar gave the security apparatus the power of arresting and 
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detaining people, particularly those in opposition. Although Bashar showed that he wanted to improve the human rights 
state, he failed to do so after taking power. The rights of association, free expression, and assembly were prohibited in Syria 
during Bashar’s presidency as it was during his father’s.  The authorities used the power they were given to arrest, harass, 
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  I. II. Oil Industry 
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challenges, while, at the same time, the economic and political system was based on oil.  Such economic system was “clearly 
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The Syrian government failure to successfully activate manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and rejection to increase 
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restart getting supplied by crude oil from Iraq, but the US prevented that from happening in order to keep the pressure on 
Syria to stop the proliferation of Jihadist across the Syrian borders (Raphaeli 2007).
According to the IMF report in 2006 (IMF Country Report No. 06/295) Syria urgently needed to boost growth in order 
to diversify, expand production and export, and absorb a bulge of a rapid population growth into the market before oil 
resources were drained. The ability of the country to cover the welfare system, the public sector, and state-owned companies 
were under question due to the rapid decline of its oil industry (Dorstal 2009). 
  I. III. The Emergence of a New Business Class and Corruption
Hafez al-Assad’s rule from 1970 to 2000 made the government exclusive; only Ba’athi members could have the chance 
to hold a significant position  in the country. By the mid 1980s, the main reason for Syrian people to join the Ba’ath party 
was to gain political and financial benefits, not because they were attracted to the ideology of the party. Key officials in the 
country were demanding bribes for any significant commerce fearless of being held accountable. Bashar al-Assad succeeded 
a chaotic and culturally corruption-accepting system. By promising to tackle the corruption, he grew optimism in the Syrian 
people. However, he was only successful in decreasing corruption among the lower levels of the government officials, while 
corruption increased at higher levels (Borshchevskaya 2010). 
Both the promised reforms of Bashar al-Assad and the gradual “opening” policy had an impact on creating a new 
business class in the country. New elites were forming from extended family ties of those already in power (Daher 2018, 
Butter 2016). Using their close ties with the regime circles, they had a share in all major areas of the Syrian economy, which 
made them direct beneficiaries of the new policy of state-led-development and partial liberalization.  The “Social Market 
Economy” model that the regime adopted in 2000, only gave them wider access to national wealth and made it easier to 
monopolize the private sector of the country.  What changed then is that “the elite’s access to wealth was a direct function 
of their being embedded in the threads of regime power through social and familiar association” (Abboud 2013: 3). The 
identity of the business elite in Syria was shadowed and kept in secret. Due to the absence of publicly available information, 
a Syrian economics magazine, Aliqtisadi, took over a year to publish the names of some top class businessmen in Syria. Yet, 
the published names were under suspicion, because some of the key people in the system, like the cousin of the president 
and a controversial businessman Rami Makhlouf, were not mentioned (Daher 2018, Borshchevskaya 2010).
From 2000, the new political and economic elite in the country started changing the core principles of the old regime that 
made Hafez al-Assad successfully rule the country. The New Elite rumbled the principles that Hafez al-Assad established, 
such as offering energy and agricultural subsidies and ensuring public sector employment.  On the surface, the aim of the 
new policies and changes was increasing the national growth by opening Syria to regional and international trade and 
investment, which will make the country realize self-development in the short and long terms. But the reality showed that 
integration in the global economy was an opportunity for a firmly regime-connected new elite to self-benefit from regional 
and international trade, which was particularly visible in the financial domain.  Eventually, the new adopted policies failed 
to deal with accumulated social and economic issues, resulting in harmful consequences to main social groups that had a key 
role in preserving and nurturing the Ba’ath governance (Azmeh 2014, Haddad 2011) 
It is true that Hafez al-Assad allowed for the emergence of dependent business elites who came from mixed social and 
political backgrounds.  They were not directly connected with the regime nor had family connections, but they were 
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politically reliant on the regime. Yet, after Bashar al-Assad came to presidency, and despite their loyalty to the regime, they 
started losing their businesses and share of the wealth.  For example, one significant businessman, from the Sanqar family, 
lost an exclusive contract to import luxurious cars to Rami Makhlouf, a member of the ruling family (Aston-Ward 2017, 
Butter 2015, Abboud 2013). 
When it comes to the economic and regulatory system in Syria before the conflict, according to 2016 Index of Economy 
Freedom, repressive economic measures by the Syrian state caused the marginalization of the private sector and blocked 
sustainable development. Monetary freedom was ruined by long and complete domination of the state as Syrian institutions 
were highly corrupted lacking any public accountability. According to Gobat and Kostial, more than 80 companies had 
to bribe officials in order to “get things done” (Gobat and Kostial 2016: 5). The judicial system was also far from being 
independent and transparent. Stagnation continued while the government kept adopting repression as a principle and tool for 
controlling the situation (Index of Economy Freedom 2016).        
A mixture of state-business deals that were mostly done through informal networks resulted in unstable and stagnant 
Syrian economy. Developing ties between high government officials and  elites from the business domain only decreased the 
potential of the state enterprises and private sector (Daher 2018, Astan-Ward 2017, Haddad 2011). Countries with unequal 
economic development and controversial government-close business elite might not be a strange phenomenon around the 
globe, but they are considered as “catalysts for uprising and revolutions” (Butter 2016: 11) 
  I. IV. Poverty and Unemployment 
Syria was facing problems with high unemployment in addition to the rapid growth of population. In 1990, the 
population in Syria was around 12.1 million, and by 2003 the population growth increased to reach 17.4 million. With this 
rapid growth, around 300,000 young Syrians were searching for work every year. Thus, due to the lack of investments in the 
country that was also a result of the political climate, work opportunities could not match the market demand (Daher 2018, 
Raphaeli 2007). 
According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, youth unemployment in 2009 was estimated to 
be around 48 percent, 6 percent higher than the unemployment rate among adults. Most of the unemployed population, 
around 54.2 percent, was in rural areas (IFAD 2011). Rapid rural-urban migration was also a result of the inefficiency of the 
agricultural sector at providing work prospects for the gradually increasing young labor population. Public and state-owned 
institutions were facing the same problems like agricultural sector (de Chatel 2014, Azmeh 2014).
In fact, accurate records of unemployment were controversial since the government manipulated those numbers for 
political reasons. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that the unemployment rate was near 18 percent. In 
order to keep unemployment rates low, the government kept recruiting governmental clerks, and it was assumed that half of 
Syrians were living off government incomes. Clearly, the situation was not sustainable and there was a dire need to decrease 
unemployment. For that purpose, there was then a desperate need for foreign investments. That was not possible because of 
the regional isolation that Syria faced at the time (Raphaeli 2007, Borshchevskaya 2010, Landis 2012).
Syria was challanged by a serious gap between economic development and growth. Poverty was increasing in rural 
areas much more than it was in urban ones, and the residents of rural areas did not see any benefits from new economic 
liberalization reforms (Gobat and Kostial 2016). The poverty ratio in Syria from 1997~2007 was the highest in the 
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kept providing an estimation of the poverty around 10 percent lower than what external sources were estimating, which was 
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of poor people above poverty was 33.6 percent of the population, which is about 6.7 million people in the country, where the 
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Syria, compared with other countries, like Egypt, was not very bad, despite the fact that both countries faced protests and 
demands for change. 
  I. I. V. Agricultural sector and environmental issues
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corrupt and rigid water management system that enabled large scale over-exploitation of water and land resources and 
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The increased population and resource mismanagement caused a high decline in renewable water per capita in the 
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2011. Experts described it as a “multisession, multilayer period of extreme drought that contributed to agricultural failures, 
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As examined in a previous section, Syria faced a big problem with the decline in oil production, which made the 
government adopt a new strategy concentrating on the agricultural sector, expecting economic growth and compensation 
for the losses in the oil sector.  The agriculture sector used to play a very important role in the Syrian economy. Around 
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which were directly contributing to the problem of continuously increasing poverty in Syria, climate change had caused the 
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Before the uprising in 2011, the communities in rural areas of the north and south of Syria were mostly affected by 
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increasing economic hardships. A severe drought that followed a shortage of rain in 2008 severely impacted the society, 
causing rural deprivation that pushed the population in rural areas to migrate to big cities. That resulted in increased poverty 
and socio-economic inequality in the society. In summery, a mix of rising new business elite with increasing poverty 
and inequality in the society was considered an explosive matter (Butter 2015, ACAPS 2013). Finally, it is important to 
add that some of the Syria conflict analysts considered that droughts, failed agricultural policies, water shortages, and 
mismanagement had direct impact on the spread of violence and the social structure falling apart in Syria (de Chatel 2014, 
Mohtadi 2012, Mhanna 2013).
II. External Factors
  II. I. Complex relationship with the US and Sanctions
History of the relations between Syria and the United States of America (USA) goes back to 1949, when the government 
of the USA was sure that the Syrian independence from the French-administered mandate was fully and effectively 
achieved. However, the diplomatic relations between the two countries faced many ups and downs. The US-Syria diplomatic 
relations continued until 1967 when they were cut due to Arab-Israeli conflict.  They were reestablished in 1974. Then, the 
relationship between the two countries deteriorated again and by 1979, Syria was listed on the State Department’s State 
Sponsors of Terrorism black list. The reason was the Syrian government’s supporting and providing of safe havens to many 
terrorist organizations. From 1990 to 2001, the relations had improved a little to the level of having some cooperation 
between the two countries on certain regional issues (The US Fact Sheet 2014, Sharp 2011).
In 2003, the relations got worse and the USA imposed sanctions on Syria. The sanctions were registered under the name 
of the ‘Syria Accountability Act’.  They included the prohibition of US products (except for food and medicine), the freezing 
of Syrian overseas assets, and the prohibition on any kind of US business with Syria whether investing or operating in the 
country.  By 2004, the sanctions extended to include blocking the property of certain people and that entailed the Commercial 
Bank of Syria. The Commercial Bank of Syria used to have the head vital role in the financial sector and development in the 
country. Among the many reasons for enacting sanctions on the Syrian Commercial Bank were issues involving huge money 
laundering activities.  Upon investigation, the US treasury investigators found out that the government in Syria illegally 
used $580 million of Iraqi Governmental Funds to boost and support Syrian Businesses without prior approval from the 
Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) (Levit 2010, Sharp 2011). It is worth mentioning that Syria was the only 
state that was listed by the US government as a terrorist sponsored state, while diplomatic relations were not totally blocked 
or stopped (GB: Parliament House of Lords 2007). Consequently, the US sanctions blocked any potential flow of money 
into the frail and underdeveloped Syrian economy with foreign direct investment. Syria was in desperate need for foreign 
investments to pave the road for creating new jobs in the rapidly worsening employment situation in the country (Raphaeli 
2007). The impact of US sanctions on Syria did much more than only expressing the US Department’s disagreement with 
the government in Syria. According to Yacoubian and Lasenski, the sanctions shook the atmosphere of trade and foreign 
investment in the country, creating a climate of doubt that had bigger impact on the economy than the sanctions did (Yacoubian 
and Lasenski 2008).
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  II. II. Stagnant Association Agreement with the EU
Bilateral relations between Syria and the European Union (EU) go back to 1977, when the Cooperation Agreement 
(CA) between representatives of Syria and the EU was signed and the CA functioned to set the trade regulations between 
Syria and the EU. According to the agreement, the EU would provide a duty-free access for Syrian industrial goods into 
the EU market, in addition to extending assistance in production and economic infrastructure to Syria. The CA had some 
modifications as amendments were adopted in 1986 and 1994. It was considered the main source for funding the EU’s 
development program in Syria, and at the same time, it was the main regulator and capstone of cooperation between Syria 
and the EU until 1995 when negotiations developed to an Association Agreement (Council of the EU 2009, The Delegation 
of the EU to Syria 2016).
Since 1995, as a result of some external developments, a new generation of policies emerged into individual Association 
Agreements (AA) between the EU and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The purpose of AA was an 
economic integration among MENA countries and EU. Bilateral agreements between the EU and MENA countries were all 
successfully signed, except for Syria. The negotiations process between Syria and the EU began in 1998, and an agreement 
was approved on a technical level by 2003. In 2005, a European Parliament delegation was sent to Syria where they declared 
the agreement signing could be expected by November of 2005. However, no ratification happened and the agreement has 
been used as a bargaining chip since then (Dorstal 2009).
The Syrian government desperately tried for years to negotiate an association agreement with the EU for it being the 
largest and most important trade partner for Syria. The failure for signing the agreement was referred to as the Syrian 
regime’s inability to meet the requirements mentioned in the agreement, such as good governance, democracy, and human 
rights, in addition to the issue of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Hinnebusch 2005). In 2007, the 
EU foreign ministry chief, Javier Solana, visited Damascus and highlighted that the agreement could be signed if the Syrian 
government stops the flow of weapons to Lebanon and lessens the tension between the government and opposition (Raphaeli 
2007, Feldman 2007).
For the Syrian government, the AA ratification was concluded out of urgency, although the government was not ready 
to implement all required conditions. The main reason behind the Syrian ratification of the agreement was to counter the 
international hostility towards Syria and the isolation created by the US after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Other reasons 
behind the Syrian government’s sped-up process for signing the AA were of economic nature. They wanted to control the 
rapidly increasing poverty and unemployment in the country. In addition, they wished to keep the private sector surviving as 
small firms were not able to employ even half of the job seekers every year, estimated between 150,000 and 200,000 people 
(Haddad 2005).
The failure to sign the ratification made the Syrian leadership change its strategy by turning towards developing stronger 
strategic and economic relations with Russia, Iran, and China.  The result was obvious as the presence of Russian and 
Chinese oil companies emerged on the Syrian soil and trade with China has flourished (Hinnebusch 2005).
  II. IV. Relationship with Lebanon 
Syria and Lebanon, regionally, were a part of the Ottoman Empire.  The civil conflicts in 1840 and 1861 were driven by 
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the sectarian structure of the society, and made the Ottoman Empire give Lebanon a distinct status; a special governance. 
After occupying the region, France divided it into four states and established a mandate on Mount Lebanon, which became 
known later as the State of Greater Lebanon. Lebanon independence came in 1943 and became the State of Lebanon, 
while Syria gained independence in 1946 to become the Syrian Arab Republic.  The social ties between the two countries 
were close, and people were considered as one in two separate entities. Syria and Lebanon were often recognized as twin 
countries. However, on the political level, the relationships were not that well all the time. It worsened until it reached the 
point of closing the borders between the two countries (Shihabi 2008).
During the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, many Palestinian guerilla fighters entered Lebanon and started conducting military 
trainings in the refugee camps, and the Southern part of Lebanon became a base for attacks on Israel. In 1970, Lebanon 
faced another influx of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters who were forced to leave Jordan. The tension in 
the country increased and clashes between the Lebanese army and PLO guerillas intensified. The clashes escalated to a war 
by 1975, dividing the country to a Christian “status quo coalition” and a Muslim-PLO “revisionist coalition”(Mohti 2010: 
26-28, Irani 2008). 
The main reason for the Syrian intervention in Lebanon was for peacemaking between the Christian and Muslim parties 
that were fighting with each other.  The Syrian intervention in Lebanon happened in three main stages. The first occurred in 
1976, after a year of civil war in Lebanon. The second stage of intervention came in February 1987, when Syrian troops had 
to move out from Lebanon due to the Israel invasion into Lebanon.  The last stage followed in 1990 with more than 25,000 
Syrian troops storming the Christian East Beirut, as East Beirut was under the control of General Michel Aoun at the time. 
It ended with the triumph of the Syrian troops, which took full control of East Beirut while general Michel Aoun fled to the 
French embassy seeking asylum. 
Lebanon was a vital interest for the Syrian president that time, Hafez al-Assad. Speaking of the Syrian dominance in 
Lebanon, Haddad (2011) stated that Syria had hegemony over Lebanon. There were more than one million Syrian labor 
workers in Lebanon. Employment in Lebanon was the main contributor for the reduction of unemployment in Syria. 
Rebuilding Lebanon after the civil war meant a good opportunity for prosperity and growth for the economy in Syria. 
Under the pressure of Syrian regime, transportation and export of goods from Lebanon faced many barriers and difficulties, 
resulting the blockade of Lebanese agricultural products to reach anywhere in the Arab world. While at the same time, 
Lebanon was not allowed to impose taxes or tariffs on the incoming Syrian products. This eventually led to the bankruptcy 
of Lebanese farmers. It was also the main cause for agricultural depression in Lebanon. 
Domination and exploitation did not stop there.  Syria took full advantage of the rich water resources in Lebanon. 
Lebanon’s River Assi, which flows from Lebanon to Syria, was under full control of the Syrian government while the 
Lebanese were not allowed to do any development projects on the river. The Syrian government wanted to keep the stream 
untouched so it could be fully utilized in the Syrian land.  It also interfered with the privatization of public sectors via 
the support of few Lebanese politicians and parliament members who blocked any privatization attempt.  Any successful 
privatization done by the Lebanese was treated as a threat that could damage business for Syrians. In the long run, it is 
estimated that the Syrian regime inflicted damages that cost Lebanon around $30 billion over the thirty years of its presence 
there (Haddad 2011). The Syrian government was indirectly ruling Lebanon through the Lebanese politicians who were 
actively and openly taking shelter at the Syrian government (Mordechai 2000).
 Many Syrian companies were deeply involved in the Lebanese business scene. They were constructing roads and 
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buildings, and having main stakes in supplying cement and electricity to Lebanon. There were many reports complaining 
about the Syrian army and secret police racketing merchants, especially when the trade was related to vegetables, cigarettes, 
and clothing. On the other hand, Lebanon was the main source for many goods in the Syrian market.  The industrial sector in 
Syria was fully dependent on smuggled goods in order to keep production going on (Kanovsky 1997).
Gambill (2011) claimed that the reason for Syria to keep the status quo in Lebanon was mainly economic, beside 
ideological and strategic motives. Keeping the presence of workers in Lebanon had many benefits for the Syrian 
government. Besides being a solution for the increasing unemployment in Syria, the total of remittances from Syrian 
workers in Lebanon reached around 40 percent, and was considered the second biggest income for Syria, right after oil. With 
the presence of many Syrian workers in Lebanon, it was easy for the Syrian intelligence to work undercover, and by using 
its political control over Lebanon, Syria pressured the Lebanese government to restrain the entry of non-Syrian workers into 
Lebanon. The Syrian workers were spared from paying taxes and work permit fees, while Lebanese workers were not. It is 
estimated that Lebanon’s loss in tax and permit fees were hundreds of millions of dollars. Such strategy did not only save 
Syrian workers from facing competition in the Lebanese market, but also gave an opportunity for Syrian customs to racket 
trafficking smugglers, charging over $1,500 per head to smuggle workers from other Arab countries into Lebanon (Gambill 
2001).
The financial sectors in Syria and Lebanon were firmly integrated.  For Syrian businessmen, the Lebanese banks were a 
financial safe haven, as they did not need to worry about paying taxes on their deposits. Among the important shareholders 
of the Lebanese banks, many were from the Syrian elite. As mentioned earlier, the US sanctions on Syria had a huge 
impact on the financial sector, but the Lebanese banks gave the Syrian businessmen a chance to avoid those sanctions 
(Yacoubian 2006). Besides, the Syrian government saw that their presence in Lebanon could be used as a strategic leverage 
in negotiations with Israel to return the Golan Heights back to Syria (Kanovsky 1997). This paper agrees with Ghadbian’s 
conclusion that the Syrian government’s initial intention to be in Lebanon was to ensure security in the area. However, later, 
the economic interest prevailed over the security one and replaced it completely (Ghadbian 2001).
The Escalation of the Uprising in Syria in 2011-2012
  III. I. Introduction 
The analysis the uprising in Syria is presented over three major axes that incited violence and made it rapidly spread. 
Each section will analyze one side of the escalation of the uprising and the regime manipulative role in it. The first section 
addresses the initial point of the uprising in the city of Dar’a where everything started and spread to other cities in Syria, 
and the starting point of the escalation of the uprising as well. The second follows on the role of the regime’s paramilitary 
forces, Shabiha. The last part illustrates the relevance of the extremists’ and militants’ release from prison in undermining 
the peaceful protests and turning them into violence.  The overall goal of this part of the paper is to reflect on how peaceful 
protests for reforms in Syria twirled into a violent and chaotic civil war. 
  III. II. Dar’a Case: Reconstruction 
This section explores the dynamics of the uprising in detail and investigates how the regime manipulated the incidents 
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which later came to be considered the climax in developing the situation on the ground from being peaceful demonstrations 
to direct clashes and violent conflict. Civil protests in Syria started by few young men using social media for organizing pro-
reform, anti-governmental protests on February 4 (Flock 2011). The protests slowly emerged in different places and times; 
in the city of Hasakah on January 26th and February 28th (Iddon 2012, Khatib and Lust 2014, WordPress 2012), followed 
by spontaneous and serious protest triggered by an incident in Damascus on February 17th where the Minister of Interior 
himself with a few high officials came to the scene to mitigate the people’s anger promising full investigation of the police 
brutality (Black 2011, Iddon 2012, Khatib and Lust 2014, Syrianon 2011).
The situation in Syria started to become more fragile and instable. However, it is important to highlight that the 
protestors’ demands were focused on reforms, freedom, and ending of the emergency law, and the humiliating and repressive 
measures inflected by security forces. The government response had been cautious so far, suppressing the protests without 
the use of lethal force. 
The next incident took place in the Southern border city of Dar’a. Its significance stems from the fact that it witnessed a 
change in the regime strategy dealing with protests. Although many considered the way the regime acted as mismanagement 
of the crisis after losing its patience with non-violent protesters (Darwisheh 2013, Holiday 2011, Kilcullen 2013), the 
following analysis of the Dar’a uprising intends to prove that the regime had intentionally adopted provocation as a style 
in dealing with protesters to cause the shift from peaceful protests to violent conflict. Few scholars agree with this research 
stance as well (Heydeman 2013, Dibo 2014). 
Dar’a is a small agricultural city in the southwestern part of Syria, famous in the country for being the breadbasket for 
Damascus. The importance of the city also appears, as it is a border city, in being a transit point for commercial trafficking 
and smuggling between three counties; Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The majority of its population is Sunni Arabs with 
small minorities of Christians, Druze, and Shi’a. The structure of the society in Dar’a is tribal, and the major tribes there are 
al-Zoubi, al-Hariri, al-Na’ime, and al-Rifai (Heras 2014). 
 The sense for solidarity inside tribal societies is very strong. They do not hesitate to defend each other regardless of any 
past grievances or hostilities among them (al-Abd 2013). Family loyalty and honor are very important in tribal communities 
as well. According to Oxford Professor Dawn Chatty, the elementary tribal feature is “kinship ties and charismatic leadership 
within [the] extended family are still extremely important for these communities” (Lund 2015). 
After Hafez al-Assad, the father, came to power, he showed an “unusual degree of flexibility in his policies towards 
tribes,” while tribalism in the pre-Assad era was considered as “one of the major ills” in the Syrian society (Dukhan 2012: 
6). Such strategy enhanced Assad’s power and broadened his base of support. Hafez al-Assad asked for the tribes’ assistance 
during the Hama conflict and to counter-balance the Kurdish population in the northeast part of Syria.  The relations between 
tribes and the regime in Syria were described as those of “patronage and clientelism.” Tribal chiefs, Mashayikh, were 
pledging loyalty to the president, promising security and stability in their areas. In return, the regime would provide them 
with financial aid, light arms and ammunition, vehicles, and some government benefits (Dukhan 2012: 14). 
Moving to the story construction of the turning point towards the escalation of Syria’s uprising, it is essential to recount 
details of the story as those details show the intricate dynamics of the escalation. 
On March 6th, fifteen young boys, aged between 10 and 15, were arrested and taken into custody in Dar’a for writing the 
famous anti-regime slogan that became wide spread during the Arab spring, “al-Shaab Yoreed Esqat el nizam!”, meaning 
people want to overthrow the regime (Hinnebusch and Imady 2018, Gifkins 2012, Khatib and Lust 2014). They were 
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detained by the Political Security Service, which was under the control of General Atef Najeeb, a close cousin of the Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad. They were brutally beaten and tortured for days. The detained young boys were from large 
famous families in Dar’a; the Baiazids, the Gawabras, the Masalmas, and the Zoubis (Macleod 2011, Commins and Lesch 
2014: 355). 
The tribes sent a delegation of their leaders to meet with the head of the Political Security Service, General Atef Najeeb, 
to ask for the release of the young boys from detention. As a tribal tradition, the delegation took their headbands off (the 
kuffiyyah and ~aqal), leaving them on the table, which meant that they would not leave until the situation is resolved. 
In tribal societies, headbands symbolize manhood and chivalry, and for the delegation to exhibit that tribal gesture, they 
expected their request to be taken seriously and to have a cooperative response. However, the head of Political Security 
Service responded disrespectfully and in a very provocative manner he threw the headbands in the dustbin. Upon receiving 
such provocation, the “networks of tribesman from al-Zu’bi and al-Masalmah tribes” organized a huge demonstration 
(Hinnebusch and Imady 2018, Dukhan 2012: 7-8). 
On March 18th, after Friday prayer in the main Omari Mosque in Dar’a, the families of the young detained boys gathered 
and went with local religious leaders to the house of the city’s mayor, Faisal Kalthoum, asking for the release of their 
children. The security forces used water cannons and tear gas to disperse the crowds, and eventually they opened live fire 
killing at least four (Olimat 2013: 146-147, Comins and Lesch 2014).
Two days after the bloody incident, the regime sent a delegation to meet the protestors reaching an agreement to release 
the detained kids. The kids were released full of bruises and injuries indicating the brutal torture they received in prison. 
This inflamed anti-government feelings and contributed in intensifying the protests.  Protesters in Dar’a took on the Omari 
mosque as a central point for gathering.  Two days after releasing the kids, regime forces assaulted the mosque killing and 
wounding many people (Comins and Lesch 2014: 355).
The dynamics of the events in Dar’a and the brutality of the regime forces made the Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
conduct research about the Dar’a happenings. The research was issued on June 2011 under the title “We’ve Never Seen 
Such Horror: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Forces” (Human Rights Watch 2011). According to HRW’s detailed 
investigation, the regime forces were systematically using lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, and, as claimed by 
witnesses, they were ordered to shoot or kill.  While the regime kept sending delegations promising investigations into the 
matter, its forces increased their use of brutality on the ground. The government was manipulating the media by denying any 
role for security forces in the violence in Dar’a, putting all the blame on protesters describing them as “instigators,” “foreign 
elements,” and “armed gangs.” The Syrian National News Agency (SANA) was used to report only the numbers and names 
of dead members on the security force side, repeatedly and firmly claiming that “armed gangs” or “terrorists” killed them 
(SANA, cited by HRW 2011). As protests became bigger, the response of the regime forces became even more brutal, 
leading to the outbreak of more protests and to violent confrontation. Dar’a residents resorted to violence only after security 
forces started massive lethal attacks, at the end of March. They burnt several governmental buildings, the mayor’s house and 
the political security building. Several security force members were killed during the confrontations (Human Rights Watch 
2011).
Due to the tribal nature of the residents of Dar’a, it was a not surprise that they would seek vengeance against the 
perpetrators of the crimes against the tribe. The idea of vengeance here does not indicate the casual meaning of seeking 
revenge against a perpetrator; it is associated with the concept of “Intiqaam” which refers to a bigger sense of honor and 
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chivalry where tribe members try to honor their name by seeking “intiqam” if anyone of their tribe members, the kids in the 
incident above, was assaulted (Dukhan 2012: 9). 
The escalation of the uprising in Dar’a was mentioned in the UN report of “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab 
Republic” A/C.3/69/L.31. Parts of this report state: “… civilian protests erupted in Dar’a in March 2011, and noting that the 
excessive and violent oppression of civilian protests by the Syrian authorities, which later escalated to the direct shelling of 
civilian population areas, fueled the escalation of armed violence and extremist groups … Expressing grave concern at the 
disproportionate use of force by the Syrian authorities against civilians, which has caused immense human suffering and 
fomented the spread of extremism and extremist groups” (United Nations 2014). The Syrian regime persistently used its 
security system to provoke the peaceful protesters in the Syrian provinces, which fell into the game by gradually seeking 
violence as a response to the oppressive measures of the regime (Hinnebusch and Imady 2018, Heydemann 2013). 
III. Shabiha
The term ‘Shabiha’ started to be used during the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, in the 1970s. Although the 
word is Arabic, it is often not understood outside of Syria. The literal meaning of the word is ‘ghosts.’ It is related to the 
nature of the Shabiha who were acting out of sight, lawless, and being in the shadow (Background Report NATO 2016, al-
Haj Salih 2012). Such perception was associated with the smuggling activities from Lebanon to Syria.
Tracking the historical origins of Shabiha paramilitary led to the Assad family (Holliday 2013). Hafez al-Assad was 
largely using the paramilitary forces in order to enforce or maintain his political power in the country. ‘Shabiha paramilitary’ 
was an adopted strategy in countering the uprising of Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s, when Hafez al-Assad armed a 
certain number of members of the Ba’ath Party in order to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood members (The Carter Center 
2013).  It is important to note that the regime did not only tolerate the existence of Shabiha, it had benefited a lot from the 
smuggling that were operated and fully controlled by Shabiha. Among the main smugglers were the nephews of Hafez al-
Assad, Fawaz and Mudhir al-Assad (Background Report NATO 2016).
In 2011, a Shabiha group, reportedly, drove through the city of Latakia in cars fully armed with machine guns and started 
shooting protesters. After that, they were also said to have taken roof top sniping positions and killed at least 21 people 
(Blomfield 2011). Shabiha is notorious for the forceful recruiting of able-bodied men and using armed men to carry out 
their activities. These recruits are said to be ill-treated and forcefully manipulated by their bosses to carry out mass murders 
(Alexander and Sherlock 2012).    
Shabiha committed numerous crimes and mass atrocities. Besides being involved in the mass forced displacement of 
people, they have been responsible for targeting Sunni villages across Syria and committing massacres of men, women, 
and children. Many of the Sunni villages, which witnessed those massacres, were in the neighborhood of Alawite and 
Shi’a villages. Due to those mass atrocities and bloody massacres which were a “cause” and “effect” of the “sectarian 
polarization,” diverse communities composed of Sunni, Alawites, and other minorities, started to divide along sectarian lines 
to a degree that made many move their residence to live next to those who belong to the same sect (Holliday 2013: 22-23).
Shabiha and regime forces committed a brutal massacre in the opposition city of Houla on May 25th, 2012, killing 
around one hundred people. Most victims were killed in cold-blood-style executions by guns and knives, and most of them 
were women and children. Survivors and witnesses were firm in identifying Shabiha to be the perpetrators, as Shabiha did 
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not care to hide their Alawite dialect and identity, and arrogantly boasted about who they are and where they are from.  The 
regime manipulation of media in this case too, blaming the opposition for the atrocity in Houla, only made people more 
furious and it contributed to the increase of sectarian tensions in the country and especially in that region (Chulov and 
Mahmood 2012, Mikaberidze 2013: 267, Adams 2015). As a consequence, that cruel brutality at Houla and Homs has “fully 
militarized the opposition” and marginalized nonviolent-resistance oriented groups like the Local Coordination Commitees 
(LCC)  (Al-Saleh and White 2013: 7).
The UN condemned the act perpetrated by the Shabiha as supported by the Syrian government. It came in the Human 
Rights Council of the UN General Assembly, and stated the following in report No. A/HRC/21/50, on August 6th, 2012: 
“The commission found reasonable grounds to believe that government forces and the Shabiha had committed crimes 
against humanity of … torture, war crimes and gross violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, including unlawful killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual violence, indiscriminate attack, 
pillaging and destruction of property. The commission found that Government forces and Shabiha members were responsible 
for the killings in Houla.”
It is crucial to stress that the central role played by this group in the Syrian civil war was for the government to create 
fear in the minds of locals and also instigate reactions from citizens. The Syrian regime used Shabiha as a special tool to 
“intimidate, beat, and detain protestors” (Starr 2012). The Syrian regime’s decision to allow brutal bloody violence and 
massacres to be perpetrated by Shabiha was to provoke reactions from Sunnis who were encouraged to fight through 
Wahabis’ sectarian propaganda (Achcar 2012). Rightfully, they earned the description stated by Christopher Philips as the 
“regime’s agent provocateurs” (Phillips 2013: 24).
This paper concedes with the conclusion of Goldsmith (2015) that the massacres, brutal beatings, detainments, and 
humiliations of protesters by the regime’s paramilitary forces, Shabiha, was more than the thought of just spreading fear and 
prohibiting protesters from demonstrating. According to Goldsmith, one of the main duties and purposes of the Shabiha’s 
actions were to “provoke the violent reactions” from the peaceful protesters who kept patient without responding to the 
provocation for several months in 2011. The spread of peaceful protests was a much bigger threat for the regime than armed 
opposition (Goldsmith 2015: 204).  
IV. Releasing extremists from prison
Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2012, the Syrian government refused to meet or negotiate with rebels. The war 
involved several factions including supporters of the Syrian government, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the 
Syrian Democratic Forces, the Salafi Jihadist group, and the Alliance of Sunni Arab rebel groups (Flock 2012, Goldsmith 
2015, Black 2016). 
There had been a huge discrepancy between the regime’s actions and what Assad said in his speeches since the start of 
the conflict in Syria. On one hand, Bashar al-Assad placed the blame for the bloody conflict in Syria on “enemies,” saying 
that the society in Syria failed not only morally, but on both social and national levels. That happened because Syrians 
were hosting a “social Incubator” for millions of local Syrian terrorists (AFP 2013, al-Yazid al-Umawi 2014). On the other 
hand, the Syrian regime released many militant extremists from prisons and those have played a critical role in derailing the 
peaceful protests goal in Syria. Assad released 260 prisoners from Sednaya prisons, 14 of whom were Kurds. One of the 
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released prisoners was a top human rights lawyer, Haitham al-Maleh. 
Initially, the Sednaya prison served as home for many Islamists and Jihadists who were nurtured, raised, and dispatched 
to Iraq during the American invasion. When the civil war erupted in Syria, the regime released many of those Islamists and 
Jihadists from prison, while on the other hand detaining and arresting moderate opposition activists. All this happened before 
the opposition of Assad’s rule became more committed. By setting the radical Islamists free, there was a high chance that 
they would fight each other, thus Assad would gain the advantage over the divided protests and bring the country back under 
control. The rise of hardcore extremist groups benefited the regime by presenting itself as secular oriented fighting jihadi 
extremists (Laub 2019).
There is also an argument that the majority of those in ISIS and other militant group leadership were among the prisoners 
released from jail by Bashar al-Assad (Cordall 2014). According to al-Awdat (2015), the militarization of the peaceful 
revolution started when Zahran Alloush was released from prison.  Soon after his release, Alloush become a military leader 
for the Islamic political military front, later known as Jaysh al-Islam, the ‘Army of Islam,’ with around sixty thousand 
fighters.  Afterwards, the Syrian regime attacked the city of Douma claiming that it was fighting terrorists (al-Awdat 2015). 
Sednaya prison was considered a “breeding ground” for militant extremists (Orton 2014).
The conditions of detainment for most were horrible. Most of imprisoned became Salafists and extremists in prison. 
Even after their release, the suffering they saw in prison had pitted them against Assad’s regime (Cordal 2014). According 
to Achcar (2016), from the beginning of the uprising, the regime was calling the protestors “terrorists,” but it faced the 
problem of proving such allegations. In order to support the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of manipulating the media with the 
“Takfiri Jihadist armed conspiracy,” from the start of the uprising, the regime had to promote the growth of jihadists inside 
the opposition lines. The adopted strategy released a significant number of hardcore militants. Eventually, several released 
prisoners became the main leaders of different Jihadist military groups in Syria (Laub 2019, Achcar 2016, Chulov 2015). 
In his research on the cooperation between target governments and terrorists, in the case of Syria, Michael Becker 
tackled the support and cooperation with extremists from the beginning of the uprising. Becker stated that “Even as the 
regime decried “terrorist” elements among the opposition, Assad ordered the release of scores of known Sunni jihadist... it 
behoves Assad, both domestically and internationally, to portray the opposition as composed “terrorists”….” (Becker 2015: 
96). The regime was aware of the weakness of Syrian society and jeopardy of extremists’ intentions and  the release of such 
intended to manipulate the events of the protest. 
Conclusion
It is not unfamiliar for the Syrian regime to use manipulation of sectarianism to secure and maintain its control. It is rather 
one of the methods that the regime has depended on for decades (Wimmen 2016, Van Dam 2011, Philips 2015, Dibo 2014). 
Despite the gravity of damage and atrocities, the regime has proven that it is willing to salvage its own survival on the 
expense of the country and the people.  As Fabrice Balanche (2018) said “Certainly, Assad has used all means necessary to 
stay in power, including tactics that exacerbate interfaith tensions, but neither he nor his father created this divisions - they 
only exploited the pre-existing vulnerabilities of Syrian society” (Balanche 2018: XI).
This paper highlighted the key factors before the uprising that affected the Syrian society and made it prone to protests 
demanding changes in the country. In order to comprehend and analyze the complexity of uprising in Syria, it is necessary to 
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examine the plethora of factors (internal and external), rather than focusing on one only. The aim of the paper was to provide 
a comprehensive analysis of the escalation of the peaceful protests and the way the regime manipulated the situation on 
the ground in order to maintain the status quo to stay in power.  These key factors laid a fertile ground for making Syrians 
dare to raise their voices asking for changes in their country. This paper aspired to contribute a better understanding of the 
escalation that led to a civil war in Syria, and the circumstance the country was facing before the war.
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